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The shifting among countries of competitive advantage in this fundamental sense is a very gradual process and must be distinguished from forces tending to produce short-term fluctuations in export performance. These forces, which include reversible movements in exchange rates, in relative costs and prices, and in relative factor productivities, are the subject of the following examination of German export performance in the 1970s.
Regional Distribution of German Exports
We gain perspective on a country's export structure by considering the country distribution and the commodity composition of its exports. As Table 1 clearly shows, the regional structure of German exports is heavily dominated by shipments to industrial countries, whose share of total German exports has remained remarkably stable over the decade in spite of * University of California.
INTERECONOMICS, July/August 1983 considerable short-term fluctuations. The share going to the European Community (EC) shows similar tendencies, while exports to the non-European industrial countries and to the United States have fallen relative to total exports. Shipments to the oil-exporting countries have risen substantially, while those to centrally planned economies expanded rapidly for a time but then receded.
The share of exports destined for developing countries has fallen since 1970, because a small rise in the share of shipments to European developing countries was more than offset by a decline to nonEuropean countries. This decline, moreover, is distributed broadly over developing countries in Africa, Asia and Oceania, and in the Americas.
The regional structure of a country's exports can have an important influence on the growth of its share of total world exports. If, for example, economic growth in the world at large is faster than in the country's main trading partners, its share of world exports will decline. In the 1970s, the industrialized countries who are the Federal Republic's major customers grew less rapidly than the developing countries; growth in the oil-exporting group of nations was also relatively rapid. In combination, world growth patterns suggest influences tending to reduce the German share of world exports. 1
According to the World Bank, growth in the industrialized market economies amounted to 3.3 % per annum between 1970 and 1980; among these, industrialized Western Europe grew at 2.8 % and North America, Japan and Oceania at 3.6 %. During the same period, average annual growth of all developing countries was 5.1%, with middle-income oil-importing countries growing at 5.6 % (covering a range of 3.5 % for sub-Saharan Africa to 8.2 % for East Asian and Pacifio nations). During this period ~nnual ~verage growth in the nonmarket industrial economies amounted to 4.8 %. Expressed in terms of growth of GNP per person, the relevant rates were: industdal countries 2.5 %, non-market industrialized economies 3.9 %; capital-surplus oil exporters 4.2 %; oil-importing developing countries 2.7 % and middle income developing oil importers 3.1%. See W o r I d B a n k : World Development Report 1981, pp. 3, 10. 
EXTERNALTRADE

160
The evolution of the exports of Germany relative to those of the world is presented in the first two columns of Table 2 . The country's share of total world exports declined in the seventies, as did its share of world exports to its major trading partners, the industrial countries. Given the importance of these countries as the Federal Republic's major customers and as her main competitors, German export performance in relation to the industrial countries as a group is given in columns 3-6. The German share of industrial country exports to the world was 16.4 % in 1970, rose to 17.9 % in 1973, and declined to 14.5 % in 1981. Similar patterns are indicated in the other columns which suggest a surge that peaks in 1973 or 1974 and a decline thereafter.
The year 1973 marks the general introduction of floating exchange rates, a major institutional rearrangement that was followed rapidly by the first oil shock. Figure 1 compares changes in the German share of world exports with two measures of the real exchange rate. A real appreciation (depreciation) of the D-mark is accompanied by a rising (falling) German share in world exports. The valuation effect of the exchange rate change thus dominates whatever changes in export volume may be brought about by that change. According to the IMF's World Outlook (1982), the EXTERNAL TRADE 
Commodity Composition
The Federal Republic's merchandise exports are heavily dominated by producer and capital goods. As the first three columns of Table 3 make clear, the relative shares in German total exports of basic and producer goods, of capital goods, and of consumer goods have changed very little over the decade, although they exhibit some cyclical variability during the period 9
In contrast to the commodity composition, export penetration has advanced substantially. As a proportion of total turnover from domestic production, exports have risen in every product group. Export penetration increased least in categories like mechanical engineering and road vehicles where the ratio was already relatively high in 1970. With the exception of iron and steel, the largest increases were registered in the consumer goods sector with textiles more than doubling, and clothes and food, drink and tobacco more than tripling their degrees of export penetration. A country's share in world exports may fluctuate, as we have already seen, due to differentials in rates of growth between its trading partners and the rest of the world. Analogous effects may be due to differences in rates of growth of demand for commodities traded in world markets, with the country's share of world exports rising when world demand for its exports rises faster than demand in general. These demand-side effects on export performance arising from growth differentials in country and commodity markets must be separated from supply-side effects involving competitiveness proper. 2
EXTERNALTRADE
Demand Versus Supply Effects
The separation of demand-and supply-side effects is presented in Fig. 2 and Table 4 . It is accomplished by means of a constant-market-share analysis of export performance which decomposes changes in a country's 162 exports into export growth it would have achieved if it had maintained its shares in the total demanded in its country and commodity markets (the demand-side effects) and a residual indicating changes in its competitiveness proper. 3
Thus, the first column in Table 4 gives the growth between 1969/71 and 1979 of the average market in various German trading partners (top half of table) and of the world markets for major commodity groups (bottom half). These may be compared with (i) the share in each market of exports from the Federal Republic at the beginning and end of the decade (columns 2 and 3) and (ii) the share of exports to each market in total German exports (columns 4 and 5). The last column gives the annual average market gain (+) or loss (-).
The influences emanating from the countrycommodity structure of German exports are displayed in Fig. 2. 4 Note that the growth of German export markets largely tracks the unweighted growth of world markets in general. The figure highlights the relation between actual and constant-share growth in German export markets. Thus, between 1972 and 1973, actual growth was faster and thus provoked a market gain; the situation was reversed in 1974/75 which saw a loss in market shares.
Comparing the beginning with the end of the period suggests that the Federal Republic managed to protect her export position, balancing weakened" positions in some markets with improved positions in others. In terms of commodities, favorable performances in food, paper and paper products, etc., compensated for weaker performance in chemicals and in electrical products.
Costs, Prices and Exchange Rates
In the foregoing market share analysis, the residual represents the influence of variations in competitiveness on a country's export performance. Since competitiveness refers to a country's ability to 2 German producers have tended to concentrate their efforts on traditional products, with rather tess attention paid to the development of more modern, high-technology products and industries. This exposes German exporters to competition from newly industrializing and developing nations. In order to maintain, let alone advance, living standards developed countries like Germany must permit the structure of their industrial base to shift toward production processes requiring relatively heavy inputs of human capital and towards increasingly sophisticated product lines. Moreover, this transformation of industrial structure must take place against a backdrop of a shrinking industrial base as these economies become increasingly service-oriented. meet the quality and price challenges of rival suppliers, it is appropriate to examine relative prices and relative costs as indicators of competitiveness.
In a competitive world, commodity arbitrage ensures that the price of highly substitutable commodities produced in different countries will tend toward equality when expressed in a common currency (allowing for transport and transactions costs, etc.). Product differentiation based on quality, brand names, joint products and joint services and the like, tends to reduce the degree of substitutability and thus loosens the relationship.
It is generally accepted that exchange rates follow purchasing power parity (P.P.P.) in the long run, but that substantial deviations from P.P.P. may be observed in the short run. They may be due to influences originating in asset markets or to distortions and rigidities in commodity markets. These fluctuations in real exchange rates imply that nominal currency values move relative to changes in relative prices. Such occurrences are especially likely in the short run when the nominal exchange rate is strongly influenced by events in the financial sector while more sluggish adjustment in the real sector governs the movement of prices.
When such departures from purchasing power parity are temporary, the resulting fluctuations in competitiveness are also of short duration and should not provoke fundamental reallocations of resourcesprovided that the transient nature of the disturbance is properly understood. Inventory changes and capital market financing of imbalances between production and sales are the temporary shock absorbers. A protracted distortion of price relationships, on the other hand, due perhaps to structural rigidities or government intervention, may provoke more fundamental quantity adjustments -including unemployment and loss of output.
We have noted the substantial fluctuations in the real value of the D-Mark during the seventies. A rise (fall) in the real value of the currency tended to be associated with a rise (fall) in the German market share. As Fig. 2 suggests, German exports tended to rise faster than the unweighted world market or the German country/ commodity market when they were rising and to fall faster when they were falling.
Wages, Prices and Productivity
The Federal Republic is a relatively open economy whose exports in 1980 represented approximately 23 % of GNP. It is a country which faces stiff competition from foreign rivals. If German producers raise prices when wage increases exceed productivity growth, they preserve profit margins but weaken the price competitiveness of their products. If on the other hand, they hold the line on prices, they squeeze profits, thereby impairing capital formation and hence the longrun health of an enterprise. It is for this reason that favorable movements in a country's relative export prices may misrepresent the true state of the export sector's competitive position to the extent that price competitiveness is achieved at the cost of profit margins.
In a detailed study of relative productivities, Kendrick 5 finds that in 1960, which he selects as a benchmark, the Federal Republic had a shortfall of 45 % vis-~t-vis the United States in national income per labor hour. (Comparable figures were 44 % for the United Kingdom, 45 % for France, 65 % for Italy and 49 % in 1970 for Japan.) He attributes 11.5 % of the German shortfall to a lower capital-labor ratio, 19.9 % to technological and efficiency factors, and 6.4 % to the "quality" of labor.
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In calculating the sources of growth for the periods 1960-1973 and 1973-1979 , Kendrick attributes a major role to capital-labor substitution in raising real gross product per labor hour. Only in Japan does this factor appear to play an even larger role. Changes in labor quality, on the other hand, play a smaller role in Germany than in the other industrial countries in Kendrick's study, while "advances in knowledge" including R+D also are accorded a significant contribution. 6
If capital/labor substitution provides an important avenue for labor productivity growth, the energy shocks of the seventies are likely to have slowed that substitution process by raising operating costs for many types of capital. At the same time, productivity-raising reallocation of labor from agriculture into industry was largely completed at the beginning of the decade and a shift of labor into the services sector with its characteristically slower productivity growth had begun.
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Hence, the major burden for total factor productivity growth must fall increasingly on technological progress. 7
International competition sharply limits the extent to which real wages may rise in the tradable goods sector of a country. The "warranted" rate of real wage increase is determined in a major way by productivity increases and by changes in the terms of trade. Labor productivity, which is shown for Germany in comparison with other countries and country groups in Table 5 , grew at lower rates after 1973 in all regions. The German overall performance during that period was superior to the seven main industrial countries, to the United States, the EC, and OECD-Europe, but it fell far short of the Japanese record. 8
The movement of actual real wages relative to the warranted real wage is given in Table 6 , where a positive (negative) entry indicates real wage movements exceeding (falling short of) those warranted by productivity growth and changes in the terms of trade. The table reflects the real wage explosion in Europe in the early seventies and the subsequent retrenchment.
competitive threats from imports produced in the newly industrializing countries. Hence, the changing situation is likely in the first instance to make itself felt in less buoyant growth or perhaps even in a decline in living standards and in a worsening domestic economic climate, rather than in major and sudden shifts in relative export position.
Outlook
The immediate outlook for the Federal Republic's export position depends on prospects for a resurgence in world production and trade. To the extent that past patterns continue to hold, a world economic recovery will bring with it not only a rise in German exports but in the German export share as well. This development is likely to be accompanied by an appreciation of the DMark.
We have seen that Germany's export performance is influenced by the rate of growth of her countrycommodity markets relative to the rest of the world. According to the World Bank, growth in GNP between 1980 and 1990 will run .between a low of 2.3 % and a high of 3.1% per annum in the industrial countries; between 2.1 and 2.8 % in the capital-surplus oilexporting countries; between 2.8 and 3.0 % in nonmarket industrial economies; and between 2.2 and 3.3 % in the developing countries as a whole. The absolute magnitudes are less important than the relative ones, for the Federal Republic's world export share will rise more, the more her country-commodity market grows relative to the unweighted world market.
In the long run, preservation of competitiveness and thus of living standards requires product and process innovation, and flexibility in the allocation of productive resources which stresses production of commodities and services demanding heavy inputs of human capital and of research and development. 
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